Employee Directors as Internal Competitive Intelligence Mechanisms: Evidence from Information Asymmetry and Investment Efficiency in Chinese Listed Firms
Diretores Representantes dos Empregados como Mecanismos Internos de Inteligência Competitiva: Evidências da Assimetria Informacional e da Eficiência de Investimento em Empresas Chinesas Listadas
Faculty of Economics and Business, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS)
Abstract
Purpose
This paper examines whether employee directors function as internal competitive intelligence actors in Chinese listed firms. It focuses on their role in facilitating the circulation of firm-specific information, supporting board-level decision-making, and improving the informational conditions under which investment decisions are made. The paper further explores whether information asymmetry helps explain this relationship and whether the role of employee directors is more evident in the case of underinvestment.
Methodology / Approach
Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies, the study employs panel regression models to examine the relationship between employee directors and investment inefficiency. Mediation analysis is used to assess the role of information asymmetry, which serves as an empirical proxy for internal information conditions. Additional tests include alternative measures of investment inefficiency and propensity score matching.
Originality / Relevance
The paper brings employee directors, information asymmetry, and investment efficiency into the same empirical setting, but frames them from a competitive intelligence perspective. Rather than treating employee directors only as a board arrangement, it considers them as internal actors who may improve information flow, support intelligence dissemination, and strengthen decision support within the firm. In this way, the study shifts the focus from governance structure alone to the informational processes that underpin strategic resource allocation.
Key Findings
The results show that employee directors significantly reduce investment inefficiency. Information asymmetry mediates this relationship. The effect is asymmetric: employee directors mainly alleviate underinvestment, while their influence on overinvestment is not statistically significant. The effect is also stronger in state-owned enterprises.
Theoretical / Methodological Contributions
The paper contributes to the literature by showing that employee directors may affect investment efficiency through their influence on internal information conditions rather than through formal board participation alone. The findings suggest that their role is closely related to information quality, internal dissemination, and opportunity recognition. More broadly, the study offers an information-based explanation of how employee directors may strengthen the internal decision conditions associated with strategic resource allocation and, indirectly, with the basis of sustainable competitive advantage.
Objetivo
Este artigo examina se os diretores representantes dos empregados atuam como agentes internos de inteligência competitiva em empresas chinesas listadas. O foco está em seu papel na facilitação da circulação de informações específicas da empresa, no apoio à tomada de decisão em nível de conselho e na melhoria das condições informacionais sob as quais as decisões de investimento são realizadas. O estudo também investiga se a assimetria informacional ajuda a explicar essa relação e se o papel dos diretores representantes dos empregados é mais evidente em situações de subinvestimento.
Metodologia / Abordagem
Utilizando uma amostra de empresas chinesas listadas na bolsa A-share, o estudo emprega modelos de regressão em painel para examinar a relação entre diretores representantes dos empregados e ineficiência de investimento. A análise de mediação é utilizada para avaliar o papel da assimetria informacional, que serve como proxy empírica das condições informacionais internas. Testes adicionais incluem medidas alternativas de ineficiência de investimento e pareamento por escore de propensão (propensity score matching).
Originalidade / RelevâNcia
O artigo reúne diretores representantes dos empregados, assimetria informacional e eficiência de investimento em um mesmo contexto empírico, mas os interpreta sob a perspectiva da inteligência competitiva. Em vez de considerar os diretores representantes dos empregados apenas como um arranjo de governança, o estudo os trata como agentes internos capazes de melhorar o fluxo de informações, apoiar a disseminação da inteligência e fortalecer o suporte à decisão dentro da organização. Dessa forma, a pesquisa desloca o foco da estrutura de governança para os processos informacionais que sustentam a alocação estratégica de recursos.
Principais Resultados
Os resultados demonstram que os diretores representantes dos empregados reduzem significativamente a ineficiência de investimento. A assimetria informacional medeia essa relação. O efeito é assimétrico: os diretores representantes dos empregados contribuem principalmente para reduzir o subinvestimento, enquanto sua influência sobre o sobreinvestimento não apresenta significância estatística. O efeito também é mais forte em empresas estatais.
ContribuiçõEs TeóRicas / MetodolóGicas
O artigo contribui para a literatura ao demonstrar que os diretores representantes dos empregados podem influenciar a eficiência dos investimentos por meio de seu impacto sobre as condições informacionais internas, e não apenas por sua participação formal no conselho. Os resultados sugerem que seu papel está intimamente relacionado à qualidade da informação, à disseminação interna do conhecimento e ao reconhecimento de oportunidades. De forma mais ampla, o estudo oferece uma explicação baseada em informação sobre como esses diretores podem fortalecer as condições internas de decisão associadas à alocação estratégica de recursos e, indiretamente, aos fundamentos da vantagem competitiva sustentável.
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